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pAbstract
This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in
occupational distribution. Workers’ utility depends on salary and working hours,
and women have a greater aversion to longer working hours than men. Simulations
indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers
discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward the working-hour
preferences of men by requiring longer working hours. Similarly, if women have a
disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men,
fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced.
JEL classification: E24, J16, J64, J71
Keywords: Equilibrium search; Gender preferences; Employer discrimination;
Employee discrimination1 Introduction
Earnings and the number of hours worked are considerably different for men and
women in the labor market. Women tend to work in occupations that require shorter
hours and pay lower wages, whereas men tend to work in longer-hour, higher-paying
jobs.
Pioneered by Bergmann (1974), the overcrowding model shows that women “crowd”
into certain occupations, which depresses their wages.1 Extending Bergmann’s model,
Johnson and Stafford (1998) provide a simple framework for understanding the factors
that affect occupational gender segregation. Their analysis shows that women over-
crowd into occupations in which they can find (i) a smaller degree of employer dis-
crimination, (ii) job characteristics preferred by women, (iii) a comparative advantage
for their gender, and/or (iv) less social pressure. All these models are based on a per-
fectly competitive labor market, in which the labor supply curve facing an individual
firm is perfectly elastic. However, if there are search frictions and workers have imper-
fect information regarding alternative job opportunities, a reduction in job value will
not result in a loss of all employees to employers. Furthermore, empirical studies find
that many workers are not perfectly matched to jobs that have their desired working
hours and that those who report dissatisfaction with their hours tend to change em-
ployers to work in positions that are more in line with their preferred hours (Altonji
and Paxson 1988; Kahn and Lang 1991; 1995; 2001).22015 Usui. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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asymmetries observed between men and women. I present a model based on the
heterogeneous-workers, heterogeneous-firms version of the Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Bontemps et al. (1999) wage-posting games.3 Relative to these papers, my
model differs in the following two dimensions. First, the utility that a worker derives
from a job does not necessarily coincide with the salary. It also depends on a nonpe-
cuniary characteristic, which I consider to be the number of hours worked. This setup
is similar to Hwang et al. (1998) and Lang and Majumdar (2004) in that it includes a
job attribute other than salary.4 Therefore, instead of a wage-posting game, my model
is a job-posting game in which every firm posts a single “tied-salary/hours offer” that
workers may accept or reject depending upon their status. The number of hours
worked is also an important determinant for the demand side of the labor market be-
cause the flow output per employee (labor productivity) is not constant, as modeled in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), but increases along with the total hours worked. Sec-
ond, there is heterogeneity of workers across gender, which I model by a preference
“shifter” in the disutility of work between males and females. Because women tend to
spend more time producing household commodities, I specifically assume that women
are more reluctant to work longer market hours.5 This is the main assumption I use to
explain the different labor market behaviors of men and women.
The equilibrium of this job-posting game is analyzed numerically. I find the following
results:
1. There is a positive correlation between the number of hours worked and salary.
Employers that are more productive require longer hours and offer higher salaries.
This prediction is in accordance with the compensating differentials theory of
Rosen (1974). Hours and salary correlate positively because the utility of the latter
compensates for the disamenity of the former. For a given salary level, men
experience a smaller disamenity to working, and more productive firms can profit
from requiring longer hours. Thus, more productive firms hire more men than
women because men require smaller salary compensation for the long hours than
women. Therefore, in equilibrium, men sort into longer-hour, higher-paying jobs,
and women sort into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs.
2. If employers experience disutility from hiring women, as in the model of
taste-based discrimination à la Becker (1971), gender segregation is reinforced.
Employers endogenously choose to post job offers with longer working hours
to dissuade women (who are averse to long hours of work) from accepting
these jobs. This strategy compensates employers for the utility loss from hiring
women.6
3. If women experience disutility from working in jobs with a higher proportion
of men, (a phenomenon called employee discrimination, which is supported
by empirical evidence using the job satisfaction data in Usui (2008)),7 the
implications for gender segregation are the same as in (2). The difference is
the channel: because the women experience lower utility in longer-hour jobs,
they prefer to either remain unemployed or to work with other women in
shorter-hour jobs. In response, employers tailor their job offerings to men to
maintain their employment size.
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simulation results. The paper concludes in Section 4.
2 The model
Consider a scenario with a large, fixed number of employers and workers (men and
women who are equally productive). The measure of men and women in the popula-
tion is nm and nf, respectively, and the measure of employers is normalized to 1.
Workers search for jobs while unemployed and employed, and employers offer job op-
portunities. Workers maximize their expected present value of utility by deciding which
jobs to accept, and employers maximize their profits.
An employer’s job offer to a worker consists of salary S and hours of work H. Because
anti-discrimination policies prohibit employers from making gender-specific offers, em-
ployers post only a single salary-hours combination that workers must accept unless no
production takes place.8 Output per employee is a concave function of the worker’s
hours worked, denoted as ρj(H) for a type-j job, where ρj(0) = 0, ρ
0
j Hð Þ > 0, and ρ
0 0
j Hð Þ < 0
for all j. There is a continuous distribution of productivity across employers, and higher-
productivity jobs have a larger marginal productivity of hours worked for any given level of
hours.
Workers value a job based on its salary and working hours. The utility of a job for a
worker whose gender is g (m for men and f for women) is
vg S;H ; ξgð Þ ¼ S þ ξgϕ Hð Þ;
where ϕ'(H) < 0, and ϕ' '(H) < 0. For simplicity’s sake, it is assumed that S and H enteradditively into workers’ utility functions and that their marginal (dis)utilities are inde-
pendent of one another. The parameter ξg measures the degree of aversion to hours
worked, which is assumed to be 0 < ξm < ξf.
Therefore, the marginal disutility of working hours is greater for women than for
men.9 Unemployed workers receive a utility flow b. Its distribution in the population
(denoted by K) is identical for men and women and is continuous on its support b;
b
 
.
2.1 Discrimination
Two types of discrimination are incorporated into the model. The first is employer dis-
crimination, modeled as the employer having a distaste dER for hiring women. In this
case, the employer’s utility per female worker is ρj(H) − S − d
ER. 10
The second type is employee discrimination, modeled as women having a disutility
factor in their utility toward working with men. Specifically, women incur a disamenity
value for working at jobs with a higher proportion of males. Denote dEE(θ) as the utility
loss for women, where θ is the fraction of men working in a job, and ∂d
EE θð Þ
∂θ < 0. Then
the women’s utility for a job is S + ξfϕ(H) − dEE(θ).
2.2 Steady-state stocks and flows
Workers sample a job offer (at rate λ) from a known distribution while unemployed or
employed. The value of a posted contract (S,H) to a man or a woman is determined by the
gender-specific utility function vg(S,H; ξg). Thus, this gender-specific utility function trans-
forms the distribution of contracts posted by employers into a gender-specific distribution
Usui IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:13 Page 4 of 14of offered job-values Fg. The distribution of job values is given by functions Fm for men and
Ff for women. Employed workers face job separation with an arrival rate of δ.
The following results, as proposed in Bontemps et al. (1999), are well known for the
worker’s optimal job acceptance strategy. When unemployed, the optimal strategy is to
accept all jobs that have a value greater than or equal to the reservation utility; this is
simply b because the arrival rate of job offers is independent of the worker’s current
state (i.e., employed or unemployed). For someone employed, the optimal strategy is to
accept all jobs that have a greater value than the current job.
Let ug(x|Fg) denote the steady-state measure of unemployed workers whose reserva-
tion utility is less than or equal to x, conditional on the utility distribution of offered
job-values Fg. Then
ug xjFgð Þ ¼
Z
b
x δng
δ þ λ 1−Fg bð Þ½ 
 
dK bð Þ
because the unemployment rate of workers with a utility flow of b is δ g ,11 andδþλ 1−F bð Þ½ 
the density of these workers is ngdK(b).
Let Gg be the distribution of job values for employed workers. Then the steady-state
measure of employed workers receiving utility no greater than vg is Gg vgð Þ
ng−ug bjFg   , where ug bjFg  is the total measure of unemployed workers in the
economy. The flow of workers leaving jobs offering a utility no greater than vg (to un-
employment or to higher-valued jobs) equals the flow of workers entering such jobs
from unemployment in a steady state. It follows that:
δ þ λ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f gGg vgð Þ ng−ug bjFg   ¼ λZ
b
vg
Fg vgð Þ−Fg xð Þ½ dug xjFgð Þ;
where dug(b|Fg) is the measure of unemployed workers with reservation utility b, and[Fg(vg) − Fg(b)] is the probability that an offer received by a worker with reservation util-
ity b is acceptable and less than or equal to vg. This result yields
Gg vgð Þ ng−ug bjFg   ¼ κZ
b
vg
Fg vgð Þ−Fg xð Þ½ dug xjFgð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ ;
where κ = λ/δ is the ratio of the job-offer arrival rate to the job separation rate. Letlg(vg, Fg) represent the steady-state number of workers available to an employer offering
vg given the utility distribution of job offers Fg. Since both lg(vg, Fg)dFg(vg) and dGg vgð Þ
ng−ug bjFg   correspond to the number of employed workers receiving a job value
vg, it follows that:
lg vg ; Fgð Þ ¼ dG
g vgð Þ
dFg vgð Þ
: ng−ug bjFg  
¼ κn
gK vgð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2
if Fg is continuous (see Appendix A for derivation), and lg(vg, Fg) is increasing on thesupport of Fg. An employer offers a higher job value to increase firm size in the steady
state. The positive correlation between job value and firm size occurs for two reasons,
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ive to currently unemployed workers. This phenomenon is known as the Albrecht and
Axell (1984) mechanism, in which workers are heterogeneous in their reservation util-
ities; as a result, a greater number of workers will prefer employment to unemployment
when a higher job value is offered. Second, a higher job value attracts currently
employed workers, which prevents them from taking another job; this phenomenon is
called the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) channel.
2.3 Equilibrium distribution of job offers
Conditional on the job packages offered by all other employers and on the search be-
haviors of men and women, each employer posts a tied-salary/hours offer that maxi-
mizes its steady-state profit (or utility) flow. In the case of employer discrimination, the
employer’s steady-state utility, given the tied-salary/hours offer, is expressed as: [ρj(H) −
S]lm(vm, Fm) for men, and [ρj(H) − S − d
ER]lf(vf, Ff ) for women. The maximization prob-
lem is
πj ¼ max
S;Hð Þ
ρj Hð Þ−S
h i
lm vm; Fmð Þ þ ρj Hð Þ−S−dER
h i
lf vf ; Ff
  ð1Þ
for all jobs.12
3 Simulation
I solve for the model described in Section 2 numerically by specifying the functional
forms for ρj(H) and v
g(S,H; ξg) as follows:
ρj Hð Þ ¼ −aj H−Tð Þ2 þ ajT2; ð2Þ
vg S;H ; ξgð Þ ¼ S− ξ
g
T−H
; ð3Þ
where 0 ≤H < T and technology parameter aj > 0 and ranges from a to ā. We use nu-
merical simulations to solve for the model because the equilibrium distribution of job
values Fg does not have a closed-form solution, as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) or
Bontemps et al. (1999). The equilibrium distribution of job values Fg is not known a
priori because Fg is determined endogenously by the distribution of salaries S and hours
H across the population (for which I solve). Because the objective function is unlikely
to be globally concave in the two-choice variables, the direct approach to the problem
is to perform a grid search, whose computation is extremely expensive. To ease the
computation of Fg, I introduce a computationally and economically intuitive algorithm
that is a good first guess for the solution. The idea is to take the economically intuitive
salary-hour combinations as the starting points and solve for the maxima that converge
from these starting points. I present the detailed description of the numerical algorithm
used to solve for the distribution of the tied-salary/hours offer in Appendix B.
The parameter values in the simulation are specified as in Table 1. There is an equal
number of men and women in the population: nm = nf = 0.5. Because the preference pa-
rameters satisfy ξm = 3000 < ξf = 60000, women are more averse to long work hours
than men. The distribution of reservation utility K(b) is normal, with a mean of −1500
and a standard deviation of 1000 for both men and women. Since ξm < ξf but the distri-
bution of reservation utility K(b) is identical for men and women, for any given job
Table 1 Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
nm Number of men 0.5
nf Number of women 0.5
ξm Men’s hours preference 3000
ξf Women’s hours preference 60000
b Reservation utility N(−1500,10002)
aj Technology parameter 0.1≤ aj ≤ 0.2
κ Ratio of job offer arrival rate to job separation rate = λ/δ 3
T Upper limit on hours worked 70
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vation utility b is larger for men than women (i.e., K(vf ) < K(vm)). Therefore, it is as-
sumed that, at any given job offer, men are more likely than women to prefer accepting
the job offer to being unemployed. The technology parameter aj is Pareto distributed,
and the productivity distribution is plotted in Fig. 1a.13
Below, I present simulation results comparing three cases: (1) a baseline case without
discrimination, (2) a case of employer discrimination, and (3) a case of employee
discrimination.3.1 Baseline case without discrimination
The equilibrium solutions are represented by the solid lines in Fig. 1b-f. As illustrated
by the solid line in Fig. 1, men place greater value on higher-productivity jobs that pay
greater salaries and require longer working hours. Conversely, women place lower
value on these types of jobs because they are more averse to long working hours.
Twenty-six percent of women never work (i.e., never participate in the labor force) be-
cause their reservation utility is greater than the utility derived from all jobs.14
Because of the presence of search frictions, jobs are not completely segregated by
gender. The fraction of men working in jobs increases with job productivity from θ =
0.0783 to 0.9846. Men quit and move to more productive jobs, and few women work in
these jobs. The labor supply elasticity ∂l
g=lg
∂S=S is positive and is greater for men than for
women in these higher-productivity jobs. This finding implies that (i) when the salary
changes in the higher-productivity jobs, the change in hours worked is greater for men
than women, and (ii) for these higher-productivity jobs, employers tailor their offers to
men’s preferences for longer working hours.15 Consequently, not only do women quit
to obtain jobs with shorter working-hours, but a high proportion of women (75.5%)
prefer to remain unemployed rather than accept higher-productivity jobs. In contrast,
in lower-productivity jobs, the labor supply elasticity is greater for women than for
men, and the changes in hours worked is greater for women than men when the salary
changes in the low-productivity jobs. Thus, for these low-productivity jobs, employers’
offers are tailored toward women’s preferences for shorter working hours.
To understand how segregation interacts with search frictions, I examine the equilib-
rium job offers when the amount of frictions is smaller (i.e., when the job offer arrival
rate λ is increased.) Specifically, I increase κ = λ/δ from 3 to 5. The results when κ = 5
Fig. 1 Baseline case
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work in jobs that they prefer. In higher-productivity jobs, employers tailor their offers
more to men’s preferences by requiring longer hours, while in lower-productivity jobs,
employers tailor their offers more to women’s preferences by requiring fewer hours. As
a result, the fraction of men in a job is larger in higher-productivity jobs and smaller in
lower-productivity jobs; in this way, segregation by gender is enforced.3.2 The case of employer discrimination
To study discrimination in an environment that has gender asymmetries in working-hour
preferences, I use the parameter values in the baseline case (κ = 3) and set the discrimin-
ation parameter as dER = 20. The results are represented by the dotted lines in Fig. 2a-d.
Fig. 2 Comparison between the baseline case and the case of employer discrimination
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one offer for both men and women, employers make their offers unappealing to women
by requiring more working hours while not significantly increasing the salary. As the
job value for women declines, women with a higher reservation utility prefer to remain
unemployed rather than work in these types of jobs. Therefore, the number of females
employed at that job declines. Men, in contrast, seldom leave their jobs. As a result, the
fraction of men working at that job increases. This increase is modest, however, be-
cause the job offers have already been tailored toward the working-hour preferences of
men in the baseline case without discrimination.3.3 The case of employee discrimination
Finally, I consider a case where women incur a disutility from working in jobs with
more men but derive a positive utility from working in jobs with more women. The
discrimination parameter is set as dEE(θ) = 500(θ − 1/2), and all other parameter values
are taken from the baseline case (κ = 3). The equilibrium solutions are represented by
the dotted lines in Fig. 3a-d.
As illustrated in Fig. 3 (dotted line), women suffer a utility loss from working in
higher-productivity jobs with high hours required and a large proportion of men. Some
women choose to be unemployed rather than work in these types of jobs. The number
of women employed in these jobs drops, and the fraction of men thus employed in-
creases. Compared with the baseline case, these employers realize less profit because at-
tractive job packages must be offered to maintain employee numbers.
Fig. 3 Comparison between the baseline case and the case of employee discrimination
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Women prefer reduced working hours and the presence of more women in the
working environment. The fraction of men decreases slightly. Employers obtain a
higher profit compared with the baseline case because women attain a higher utility
without incurring further costs. Specifically, in the least productive jobs (where the
technology parameter is aj = 0.1), the utility that women derive from only the tied-
salary/hours package is −858.06 (=S + ξfϕ(H)) (which is almost equivalent to the
utility women derive in the baseline case, −858.08), but the actual utility that
women receive is higher because vf = S + ξfϕ(H) − dEE(θ) = − 664.32.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze an equilibrium search model in which salary and working
hours are job attributes, and men and women differ in their working-hour prefer-
ences. In particular, women are more averse to longer working hours than are men.
Every employer posts a single menu of salaries and working hours, which workers
may accept or reject depending on their employment status. Because the equilib-
rium of this model does not admit closed-form solutions, I propose an algorithm to
numerically solve for the equilibrium. The qualitative features of the equilibrium are
studied via simulations.
The simulations indicate that employers with a larger marginal productivity of
hours require more working hours. Women, who are more averse to longer working
hours than men, predominate in less productive jobs, which offer fewer working
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require more working hours. This discrimination effectively excludes women from
those jobs. Employers can control the gender of workers they hire by choosing to
offer certain job amenities because different genders of workers tend to have differ-
ent job amenity preferences.
If employee discrimination against women increases with the proportion of men
working in the job, employers tailor their offers to the group from which they can
hire more workers. Women place a smaller value on higher-productivity jobs
because of the greater working-hour requirements and the disutility from the higher
concentration of men. Conversely, women place a greater value on lower-
productivity jobs because of the shorter hours and the amenity from the higher frac-
tion of females. Consequently, higher-productivity jobs are tailored more toward the
working-hour preferences of men, and lower-productivity jobs are tailored more to-
ward those of women. Therefore, segregation is reinforced.
Because the model yields empirical predictions regarding discrimination and gender
differences in preferences, future researchers may calibrate the search model by using
labor market survey data. It would be a challenging exercise to identify the discrimin-
ation and preference parameters, but this examination would enable us to answer the
question of whether it is employers, employees, or neither group that discriminates in
the labor market.Endnotes
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on occupational gender segregation.
2Altonji and Paxson (1986) and Senesky (2005) find that the variance of the change
in hours worked is much higher for job movers than for job stayers. This finding im-
plies that employers place significant constraints on their employees’ choice of hours
worked and that job movers are less constrained in their choice of hours worked than
job stayers.
3The wage-posting model explains a number of stylized facts. For instance, wages are
dispersed, and larger firms offer higher wages.
4Hwang et al. (1998) present a Burdett-Mortensen model in which heterogeneous
employers who differ in the production technology of job amenities post a tied-salary/
amenity offer to homogeneous workers. In contrast, Lang and Majumdar (2004) con-
sider a nonsequential model in which homogeneous employers make a take-it-or-leave-
it tied-salary/hours offer and trade off the salary/hours package against the possibility
that the offer may be rejected.
5Using the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I find that the probability of report-
ing overemployment is higher for women than for men (Usui, 2009). Following Ham
(1982, 1986), Altonji and Paxson (1988), and Kahn and Lang (1991, 1995, 2001), I cre-
ate the overemployment measure by utilizing variables that indicate constraints against
workers’ hours on the job.
6Holden and Rosén (2014) analyze an equilibrium search model in which it is
costly for the firm to lay off a worker and where the workers have identical prefer-
ences and productivity characteristics. They show that there exists a discriminatory
Usui IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:13 Page 11 of 14equilibrium in which one type of worker (e.g., immigrants) is hired only when the
employers receive a high signal that corresponds to the probability that the match is
of high quality, while the other type of worker (e.g., nonimmigrants) is hired regard-
less of the signal. This is because it is more costly for employers to hire workers
from the former group, since the expected duration of a bad match is longer for this
group as a result of their having worse outside employment opportunities. They also
show that profit-maximizing employers without discriminatory preferences will
nevertheless practice discriminatory hiring, which is in contrast to Becker’s (1971)
discrimination model.
7There is empirical evidence that women care about the fraction of their
co-workers who are female. According to job satisfaction data from the U.S.
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, women who move to jobs with
more men report that co-workers are less friendly and that their physical sur-
roundings are less pleasant, whereas men who move to jobs with more men re-
port that coworkers are more friendly and their surroundings more pleasant
(Usui 2008).
8In Usui (2002), I present an alternative equilibrium search model in which em-
ployers can condition job offers by gender. This model is a simple extension of
Hwang et al. (1998) because profit-maximizing employers post separate offers for
men and women. Consequently, there is no need for employers to consider the
difference in gender preferences or the mix of men and women who choose their
jobs.
9Alternatively, H can represent the effort that an employee puts into the job. Effort
increases productivity, and effort is more costly for female employees than for male
employees. Gneezy et al. (2003) provide experimental evidence that men exert more ef-
fort than women in high-stakes situations.
10Employer discrimination in the framework of search models has been studied by
Black (1995), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), and Flabbi (2010).
11The unemployment rate is derived from the equality of the flow of workers into
employment and the flow from employment to unemployment.
12For the case without discrimination, eliminate the disamenity value dER in Equation
(1). For the case of employee discrimination, subtract the term dEE(θ) from the
female utility.
13The probability density function of the technology parameter is 2:83000
2:8
3000þ aj−0:1ð Þ50000 ;
which is defined over the interval aj ≥ 0.1. In the simulation, one hundred jobs are
chosen at regular intervals along the segment aj = [0.1, 0.2], and the equilibrium job
offer is derived for each of these jobs.
14The corresponding number for men is 1.75 %.
15Higher-productivity jobs offer a higher hourly wage (= S/H). This positive rela-
tionship between productivity and hourly wage is due to search frictions, in that
higher-productivity jobs are more generous in regard to salary than in regard to
hours of work.5 Appendix A
Derivation of lg(vg, Fg)
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g vgð Þ ng−ug bjFg  
dFg vgð Þ ¼
dGg vgð Þ ng−ug bjFg  
dvg
dvg
dFg vgð Þ
¼ dv
g
dFg vgð Þ 
κ
Z
b
vg dFg vgð Þ
dvg
dug xjFgð Þ 1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2
2
6664
þ
κ2
dFg vgð Þ
dvg
Z
b
vg
Fg vgð Þ−Fg xð Þ½ dug xjFgð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2
#
¼
κ
Z
b
vg
1þ κ 1−Fg xð Þ½ f gdug xjFgð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2 :
Use {1 + κ[1 − Fg(x)]}dug(x|Fg) = ngdK(x), which is derived from the first steady-state
condition. Then lg(vg, Fg) is simplified to
lg vg ; Fgð Þ ¼
κ
Z
b
vg
ngdK xð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2 ¼
κngK vgð Þ
1þ κ 1−Fg vgð Þ½ f g2 :
6 Appendix B
I propose a two-step algorithm for solving for the distribution of the tied-salary/hours
offer. In the first step, I compute economically intuitive salary-hour combinations.
Then, in the second step, I compute the optimal salary-hour combinations starting
from the values determined in the first step.
Step 1: Initialization Points. Because men and women have different preferences
concerning hours, profit- (or utility-) maximizing employers post a salary-hour combin-
ation that considers the differences in gender preferences and the mix of men and
women who would typically choose their jobs. Therefore, hours of work are first deter-
mined such that the marginal productivity of an hour equals the weighted average of
the marginal disutility of an hour for men and women, where the weights reflect the
gender composition of the particular job type in equilibrium. Let θj be the fraction of
men working in a type-j job in equilibrium. Then Hj solves as follows:
ρ
0
j Hð Þ þ θj ξmϕ
0
Hð Þ þ 1−θj
 	
ξ f ϕ
0
Hð Þ
h i
¼ 0:
Using the functional forms for vg(S,H; ξg) and ρj(H) that are given in Equations (2)
and (3), the hours are determined as
Hj ¼ T−
θj ξ
m þ 1−θj
 	
ξ f
2aj
0
@
1
A
1=3
: ð4Þ
Next, the salary is chosen to maximize the steady-state profit (or utility) flow, givenHj and θ

j :
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Sð Þ
ρj H

j
 	
−S
h i
lm S þ ξmϕ Hj
 	
; Fm
 	
þ ρj Hj
 	
−S−dER
h i
lf S þ ξ f ϕ Hj
 	
; Ff
 	
: ð5Þ
The algorithm I use to solve for the distribution of (S,H) is as follows: First, I makeinitial guesses for S0 and θ0 and then compute the hours H0 using Equation (4). Given
the distributions of S0 and H0, I derive the distributions of the job values Fg(vg) and the
fraction of men working in jobs θ1. I then obtain salary S1, using the first-order condi-
tion of Equation (5). Given the updated distributions of (S1, θ1), I again compute the
hours H1 by using Equation (4). I continue this procedure until (S,H, Fg) converges.
Step 2: Newton Method. In determining the hours in Equation (4), I did not con-
sider the difference in turnover behavior between men and women, even though em-
ployers are likely to place greater value on workers who remain in the job longer. The
solution derived in Step 1 may therefore not be optimal.
The second step of the algorithm performs a Newton method on the H variable.
Starting from the salary-hour combinations derived in Step 1, I solve for the salary-
hour combinations that satisfy (i) the first-order conditions for local maxima in
Equation (1):
∂πj
∂S ¼ 0 and
∂πj
∂H ¼ 0 for all j;
and (ii) the second-order condition that implies that the Hessian matrix is a negative
definite:
∂2πj
∂S2
< 0;
∂2πj
∂H2
< 0;
and
∂2πj
∂S2
∂2πj
∂H2
−
∂2πj
∂S∂H

 2
> 0 for all j:
In particular, I first update the hours by Hk + 1 =Hk + ψ∂π/∂Hk, where ψ is the nega-
tive of the inverse of the second-order derivative. Given the salary and the updated
hours, I solve for the distributions of the job values Fg(vg) and employment size lg(vg,
Fg). Then salary S is derived using the first-order condition with respect to S in
Equation (1). The hours are again updated by Hk + 1 =Hk + ψ∂π/∂Hk. This procedure is
repeated until (S,H, Fg) converges and all jobs satisfy the first- and second-order condi-
tions for Equation (1).
To examine whether the solution derived with this two-step algorithm is the best
one, I take various initialization points and use the Newton method in Step 2 to solve
for (S,H). In cases in which (i) the initial hours and salary distributions are chosen to
increase with job productivity and (ii) the second-order derivative with respect to hours
remains negative during the iteration process, the salary-hours bundles converge to the
same solutions as the two-step algorithm does. However, others do not converge to sat-
isfy the profit (or utility) maximization conditions of Equation (1). Therefore, the ad-
vantage of using the two-step algorithm is that the algorithm produces optimal
solutions in a short amount of time.
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